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Abstract
We uncover the short- and long-run structural determinants of the existing cross-country 
heterogeneity in public-private pay differentials for a broad set of OECD countries. We 
explore micro data (EU-SILC, 2004-2012) and macro data (1970-2014). Three results 
stand out. First, when looking at pay gaps based on individual data, more than half of the 
cross-sectional variation of the sample can be accounted for by the degree of exposure to 
international competition, and by the size of the public sector labour force and its composition 
(i.e. the intensity in the provision of pure public goods), while labour market institutions 
play a very limited role. Second, we fi nd that pay gaps have narrowed signifi cantly during 
the recent fi nancial crisis; nevertheless, this decrease can be explained by the widespread 
process of fi scal consolidation rather than by structural factors. Third, we fi nd that in the 
log-run openness to international trade and improvements in the institutional quality of 
governments are associated with decreases in the public-private wage gap. Our fi ndings 
can be rationalised by a body of research stressing non-competitive wage settlements in 
the public sector.
Keywords: public sector pay gap, government monopolistic power, wage-setting institutions.
JEL classifi cation: J31, J45, H50.
Resumen
En este artículo investigamos los determinantes estructurales de corto y largo plazo de 
la heterogeneidad existente entre países en los diferenciales salariales entre trabajadores 
públicos y privados, utilizando una muestra amplia de países de la OCDE. Usamos tanto 
microdatos (EU-SILC, 2004-2012) como datos agregados (1970-2014). Encontramos tres 
resultados principales. En primer lugar, al analizar los diferenciales salariales basados en 
datos individuales encontramos que más de la mitad de la variación en la sección cruzada 
puede explicarse por el grado de exposición a la competencia internacional, así como por el 
tamaño de la fuerza laboral del sector público y su composición (grado de intensidad en la 
provisión de bienes públicos puros), mientras que las instituciones del mercado de trabajo 
desempeñan un papel muy limitado. En segundo lugar, encontramos que los diferenciales 
salariales entre el sector público y el privado se han reducido signifi cativamente durante 
la reciente crisis fi nanciera. Sin embargo, esta reducción se explica por los procesos de 
consolidación fi scal, y no por factores estructurales. En tercer lugar, mostramos que en el 
largo plazo la apertura al comercio internacional y mejoras en la calidad institucional de los 
Gobiernos están asociadas a caídas en el diferencial salarial. Estos resultados empíricos 
son coherentes con una rama de la literatura teórica que enfatiza la existencia de procesos 
de determinación de los salarios no competitivos en el sector público.
Palabras clave: diferenciales salariales entre el sector público y el privado, poder monopolista 
del Gobierno, calidad institucional.
Códigos JEL: J31, J45, H50.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we empirically study the short- and long-run structural determinants of the existing
cross-country heterogeneity in public-private pay differentials for a broad set of OECD countries.
It has been argued that the existence of positive wage premia may affect labour market outcomes
because of distortions on the optimal allocation of the labour force among economic sectors and
create overall economy productivity losses.1
An extensive literature has dealt with the estimation of public-private wage differentials in a
large number of countries. The differentials tend not to be entirely explained by the individual
attributes of workers, and are found to be heterogeneous across countries both in terms of their
size and their sign, even though positive gaps tend to prevail, thus signalling the existence of a
so-called public-private pay gap.2 Overall, unexplained positive public-private wage differentials
tend to be larger for female workers, workers at the lower-end of the wage distribution and
younger workers.3 The existence of earnings differentials between the public and the private
sectors in a number of countries has also be highlighted by a strand of papers that uses macro
(aggregate) data, 4 which stress the potential distortions in the labour market such a differential
may induce.5
The literature has provided some theoretical explanations to account for the cross-country
heterogeneity in public-private pay gaps. One body of research argues that the monopolis-
tic power of governments in the provision of public services results in non-competitive wage
settlements. For example, starting from the observation that wage gaps tend to be larger in
countries with lower shares of government employment, some authors develop models in which
a smaller group of public employees derive monopoly power from a tighter control of the pro-
duction of public goods/services.6 The link between the monopolistic power of governments and
non-competitive wage settlements is amplified by the fact that the objective functions of the
government and the private sectors may differ: whereas the latter is largely guided by market
1See for instance Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) and European Commission (2014).
2An overwhelming majority of the literature looks at wage level differentials. Nevertheless, some papers look
at lifetime values of employment between public and private sectors, such as Dickson et al. (2014). These authors
look at lifetime values instead of wage levels because they claim that differences in earnings mobility, earnings
volatility, and job risk across sectors occur in many instances and may matter to forward-looking individuals.
3For some recent contributions to a fast expanding literature see Giordano et al. (2015), Depalo et al. (2015),
European Commission (2014), or Christofides and Michael (2013), and the references quoted therein. On related
grounds a strand of the literature looks at the “politicians’ pay gap” (see in particular Peichl et al. (2013), for
the case of Germany).
4See for instance Holm-Hadulla et al. (2010) and the references quoted therein.
5More recently, Cavalcanti and Rodrigues dos Santos (2015) develop an equilibrium model with endogenous
occupational choice among the public and the private sectors, in which a public-private earnings premium is
characterised. They calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy. They show that the presence of a public-private
earnings premium can generate important allocation effects in the economy and sizeable productive losses.
6See Ferna´ndez-de-Co´rdoba et al. (2012) or Kollintzas et al. (2015). On related grounds, on the appropriation
of resources by the bureaucracy in the form of higher wages see Marconi et al. (2009).
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forces and profit constraints, the former may pursue political motives. For instance, it has been
argued that politicians use public employment for redistributive purposes, directing income to-
wards disadvantaged groups,7 or that politicians are likely to link public wage agreements to
election cycles.8 9 In turn, another set of theories stresses the fact that labour market insti-
tutions differ markedly between the public and the private sectors. For example, it has been
documented that union density tends to be higher in the public sector.10 On related grounds,
it is argued that a wage premium arises because of differences in the bargaining power within
the private and the public sectors.11 Other explanations are linked to the degree of public wage
setting centralization of countries.12
Surprisingly enough, there is very limited empirical evidence that could help validate the
alternative theories to explain the public-private pay gap just described. European Commission
(2014) provides simple rank correlations between public wage gaps estimated with 2010 data
for 26 European Union (EU) countries and some country characteristics, such as labour market
institutions and the size of the government as an employer. They find a positive correlation
between the public-private wage gap and employment protection legislation, and conjecture
that this might arise because higher compensations are needed to make public employment
attractive when private employment is more strongly protected. They also find a negative
correlation with the size of public employment in the labour force, as also shown by others.13 In
turn, within the public administration literature, Llorens (2008) studies the determinants of US
state-level public-private wage gaps, and finds that, in particular cases, state unemployment,
citizen liberalism, and unionisation affect the gap positively.
In this paper we aim to fill in this gap in the literature by providing broad-based empiri-
cal evidence on the variables driving the cross-country variation in public-private wage premia.
To do so we use two different and complementary data sets to compute wage gaps. First, we
estimate public-private pay gaps for 25 (mostly EU) countries on the basis of data from the
“European Union Survey of Living Conditions”(EU-SILC henceforth) for the period 2004 to
2012. Following the extant literature, we define public workers as those employed in the Public
Administration, Education, and Health industries, as opposed to market activities, which con-
stitute the private sector. The estimated public pay gaps are at the average of the distribution,
and control for observable characteristics of workers. Second, in order to expand the sample and
7Alesina et al. (2000).
8See for example Matschke (2003)
9It has also been argued on theoretical grounds (Becker and Stigler (1974)) that the public wage premium
may serve as an effective policy to fight corruption. Nevertheless, as discussed by Marconi et al. (2009) this is
hard to justify for two main reasons. First, governments own other instruments to fight corruption. Second, the
fight against a high degree of corruption could demand a much larger budget.
10Visser (2013).
11See for instance Holmlund (1993) and Holmlund (1997).
12See for instance Caponi (2014).
13See the stylised facts presented by Ferna´ndez-de-Co´rdoba et al. (2012) and Kollintzas et al. (2015).
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analyse medium-term determinants, we use national accounts data for the period 1970-2014,
covering 19 developed countries. In this case, by using aggregate data, we define the public pay
gap as the ratio of total compensation per employee in the general government sector over that
of the private sector.
Our main findings are the following. First, we show that more than half of the cross-sectional
variation in micro-data-based public pay gaps over 2004-2012 can be accounted for by the size
and composition (specialization in public or individual goods) of the public labour force, as well
as exposure to international competition. Second, and on related grounds, we estimate that wage
differentials have narrowed down significantly during the recent financial crisis. Nevertheless,
pay gap changes between 2007 and 2012 can be explained by the widespread process of fiscal
consolidation rather than by structural factors. Third, from a long run perspective (using
macro data), we show that openness to international trade and improvements in the quality of
governments have been associated with decreases in the public wage gap.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the database, the estimation
of the public pay gaps with micro data, and the linkages between different (micro and macro)
measures of the gap. Section 3 analyses the determinants of the cross-country variation of pay
gaps. First, of the cross-section of gaps estimated with micro data, next by exploiting the
variation witnessed in the recent financial crisis, and finally, adopting a long run perspective.
Finally, Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2 Data and variables
2.1 The public-private pay gap with micro data
As regards sources of micro data, we use the “European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions” (EU-SILC) survey, given its cross-country comparability, data availability for the
pre- and post-crisis periods (2004-2012), and the fact that it covers most of European Union
countries (all with the exception of Finland, Malta, Bulgaria and Croatia), as well as Norway
and Iceland. The distinction between public and private sector employment is based on NACE
(Statistical Classification of Economic Activities), Rev.2. The most recent data refers to the 2013
EU-SILC wave, which includes employment and earnings information pertaining to 2012. In this
framework, as it is standard in the literature, the government sector is an approximation based
on either the aggregation of the O (Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social
Security), P (Education) and Q (Health and social work) sectors of the NACE classification
(broad definition), or only the O sector (restricted definition). With the EU-SILC database
it is not possible to separate public employees from private sector employees in any of the
sectors, being this particularly relevant for activities P and Q, where private providers are more
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prevalent.14 In the case of EU-SILC data, the definition of wages per employee is computed
based on the individual gross monthly earnings (including only monetary earnings and excluding
financial income from investments, assets, savings, stocks, and shares) before netting out taxes
and social contributions, and the number of hours worked per week in the main job.
We estimate the part of the wage gap that remains unexplained after (observable) individual
characteristics are controlled for. We follow the common approach of running Mincer-type
wage regressions taking the logarithm of gross income per hour as the dependent variable. The
set of covariates includes binary variables denoting married status, low and high education,
managerial position, part-time job, gender, year and region fixed effects, as well as a second
degree polynomial in experience (or age and age squared whenever information on experience is
not available).15
The specification also includes a binary variable (public) denoting that the individual works
in the public sector. Thus, as per the usual approach, the coefficient associated with the variable
(public) represents the earnings differential (evaluated at the mean of the distribution) that
remains once the other relevant determinants are controlled for and, if estimated to be positive,
it is labelled a public-private pay differential/premium/gap (or pay penalty if negative).16
The specification for each country looks as follows:
14According to ESA 2010, the general government sector consists of “institutional units which are non-market
producers whose output is intended for individual and collective consumption, and are financed by compulsory
payments made by units belonging to other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution
of national income and wealth”. As such, the non-market activities O, P, and Q, represent the best proxy for
the general government sector when this indicator is not provided. Having said this, it is worth noting that it is
not possible to carry out a broad check on how well these non-market activities encompass general government
employees, due to the lack of across-countries homogeneous datasets. Indeed, there exists heterogeneity across
countries in the public sector involvement in the different sectors of the economy. For example, according to
Danmarks Statistik and the Spanish Labour Force Survey, while in Denmark the number of general government
employees in the Health and Education sectors is close to 90% and more than 80%, respectively; in Spain these
percentages are about 50% and 60%, respectively. On the contrary, the vast majority of workers in sector O are
public sector employees: 94% and 97% in Denmark and Spain, respectively.
15It must be stressed that there may be other relevant characteristics that affect the wage differential. In
particular, in this study data limitations prevent us to control for a number of factors: among others, fringe
benefits (which are typically higher in the private sector) and pension rights (generally higher in the public
sector), but also non monetary factors, such as job security, that is generally larger in the public sector. Finally,
our data do not allow to control for the sample selection bias due to the possibility that sorting of employees
between sectors is not random but occurs on the basis of unobserved characteristics. All this said, it has to be
mentioned that the bulk of our results is in line with previous country-specific analyses with finer data (for a
recent contribution, see Hospido and Moral-Benito (2014), and the references quoted therein). For more details,
see Giordano et al. (2015) and Depalo et al. (2015).
16Other approaches to measure unexplained gaps in mean outcomes comprise the so-called “Oaxaca-Blinder”
decomposition, see Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and the alternative proposed by Neumark (1988). We follow
the approach of a dummy indicator for convenience and because it tends to be bounded by the two standard
Oaxaca-Blinder gaps. Moreover, the Neumark (1988) approach systematically overstates the contribution of
observables to mean outcome differences. For a discussion on these four approaches, see Elder et al. (2010).
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yi = Xiβ + δpublici +
2012∑
t=2004
λt + i (1)
where i is an iid idiosyncratic error term and the coefficients β, δ and
∑2012
t=2004 λt are
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Table I shows the estimates of the coefficient δ i.e.
the public sector pay gap. In a subsequent section of the paper we will identify the variables
that account for the cross-sectional heterogeneity of δ, its evolution during the recent financial
crisis, and its dynamics during the last decades.
Individual characteristics account for a substantial fraction of the observed public-private
wage gap, but there remains an unexplained gap. For the pool of euro area countries, the
estimated unexplained wage gap over the 2004-2012 period for the broad NACE proxy to the
government sector (OPQ sectors) is 60% lower than the estimated unconditional wage gap
(Table I, column (2) versus (1)), since the observable characteristics between the two sectors are
different, e.g. in the public sector workers are on average better educated than in the private
sector. For the period 2004-2012 as a whole positive wage gaps are estimated for 21 out of the
23 analysed EU countries. Unexplained wage gaps are larger for countries that suffered fiscal
stress over the crisis (Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Italy) and Luxembourg, and
tend to be higher when a more restricted definition of the government sector (NACE O sector)
is considered (Table I, column (5)), i.e. when looking at the sectors in which there exists a
quasi-monopoly power of the government as service provider. There has been a reduction in the
estimated (unexplained) wage gap as a consequence of the economic crisis and the recent fiscal
consolidation episode (Table I, column (4) versus (3)). For the euro area as a whole (pool),
the estimated conditional wage gap for the period 2010-2012 for the broad NACE proxy of
government-related activities is 40% lower than the one estimated for the 2004-2009 period. In
general, the wage premium falls more markedly in countries with larger pre-crisis levels.
2.2 The public-private pay gap with macro data
Regarding macro (aggregate) data, we focus on the general government sector as defined by the
National Accounts, for the period 1970-2014. The longer time span is the first advantage of
complementing micro-based pay gaps with gaps computed from macro data. In this latter case,
our sample covers 19 developed countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. The primary source of government wage bill data
and all macroeconomic variables used throughout the study (GDP, prices, total economy wages
and employment, population) is Eurostat for EU countries and the OECD (Economic Outlook
Database) for non-EU countries (see Table A.1 of Appendix A for the definition and sources of
all the variables used in the paper). General government employment data, in turn, are taken
from the OECD database. The measure of aggregate (macro) wages chosen for our analysis is
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Table I
Estimates of the Public Pay Gap
EU-SILC 25 Countries
Full Sample Full Sample Pre-Crisis Crisis Full Sample
2004-2012 2004-2012 2004-2009 2010-2012 2004-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable: Gross Income per Hour
Euro area pool 0.182∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Belgium 0.064∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.001 0.018∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Germany 0.096∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 0.118∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Estonia 0.037∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Ireland 0.347∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
Greece 0.382∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Spain 0.369∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
France 0.045∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Italy 0.285∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Cyprus 0.508∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Latvia 0.211∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
Lithuania 0.242∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
Luxembourg 0.272∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Netherlands 0.137∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Austria 0.186∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Portugal 0.422∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Slovenia 0.244∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Slovakia 0.064∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Czech Republic 0.102∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Denmark 0.035∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.041∗ 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016)
Hungary 0.180∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ -0.003 0.128∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Poland 0.301∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Sweden -0.040∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017)
United Kingdom 0.088∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.013 0.129∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Iceland -0.037∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013)
Norway -0.067∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Public Sector Defined as: Broad Broad Broad Broad Restricted
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the public sector pay gap conditional on observable characteristics
(equation 1). The public sector is defined as industries (NACE Rev. 2) O (Public Administration), P (Education),
and Q (Health and social work), except column (5), where the public sector only comprises the industry O.
The dependent variable is gross income per hour, computed as the ratio of individual gross monthly earnings
(including only monetary earnings and excluding financial income from investments, assets, savings, stocks, and
shares) before netting out taxes and social contributions, and the number of hours worked per week in the main
job. Controls include: binary variables denoting public sector (which coefficient is shown) married status, low
and high education, managerial position, part-time job, gender, year and region fixed effects, as well as a second
degree polynomial in experience (or age and age squared whenever information on experience is not available).
The specification of column (1) does not include observable characteristics (unconditional public sector pay gap).
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered at the individual level. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%;
∗∗∗: 1%.
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compensation per employee. The main reason why we focus on total compensation rather than
on wages is data limitations in terms of sample size and coverage of countries in our sample.
We compute compensation per employee using compensation of employees and employment
data. Compensation of private sector employees is defined as total economy compensation of
employees minus compensation of government employees. Compensation per private employee
is defined as private compensation of employees divided by total employees minus government
employment minus self-employment. In Figure I, panels A and B, we show the evolution over
time of public-private pay differentials for a selection of countries. The evolution of the wage
gaps is to a high extent country-specific, although there exists a pattern of decreasing pay gaps
in the 1970s, stabilization, and a subsequent increase since the 1990s, at least for some countries.
Regarding the level, countries in northern Europe have lower and negative pay differentials when
compared with other EU countries, United States, and Japan.
The use of macro data allow us to use a delimitation of the government sector, the gen-
eral government, that is more accurate that the approximation based on non-market activities
(NACE sectors O, P and Q) used in the previous section.17 The main disadvantage is that the
wage gap thus computed does not control for characteristics of the labour force, therefore it
tends to be larger. We will address this bias on a subsequent section by performing our regres-
sions in first differences, hence removing this bias in levels. Our implicit assumption is that the
bias remains relatively constant over time.
In Figure I, panels C and D, we compare the wage gaps computed from macro data with
those computed from micro data, both conditional and unconditional on characteristics (columns
(2) and (1) of Table I, respectively), for the group of countries present in both samples over the
sample period in which they overlap (2004-2012). As expected, the wage gaps computed from
macro data are generally larger, but are much closer to the unconditional wage gaps computed
from micro data. More importantly, the cross-country patterns observed in the micro data are
preserved in the macro aggregates, hence the analysis with aggregate data is meaningful.18
2.3 Hypotheses to be tested
We characterise the variables that explain the cross-country variation in the public-private wage
gap. Our choice of covariates relies on a body of research that has rationalised the existence of
public-private wage differentials. Hence, we view our paper as an empirical test of these theories.
17Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that while the choice of macro data sources and definitions insures the
best available degree of harmonization and comparability, there might be measurement problems both within
and across countries. Differences/changes in working hours, privatization, differences/changes in the size of the
public sector over time, or changes in the skill composition of the labour force over time might distort the view
on certain issues.
18One country, Luxembourg, significantly deviates: it has a large micro wage gap and a below average macro
gap. For the sake of transparency we decided not to drop this country from the sample. The results are qualita-
tively very similar had we chosen to do so (first-differencing removes the largest part of the bias).
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Figure I
Public-private Pay Differentials Computed from Macro Data
and Comparison with Micro-based Pay Gaps
Panel A: Macro gaps for selected countries:
1970-2014 (I)
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Panel B: Macro gaps for selected countries:
1970-2014 (II)
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Panel C: Conditional micro and macro gaps:
average of 2004-2012
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Panel D: Unconditional micro and macro gaps:
average of 2004-2012.
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Notes: Panels A and B show the evolution of public-private pay differentials (computed from macro data) for a selection
of countries. Panel C compares the public sector pay gap conditional on observed worker characteristics (EU-SILC, see
equation 1) with the wage gap computed from aggregate macro data (National Accounts). Panel D compares the latter
with the public sector pay gap computed from micro data (EU-SILC) unconditional on observed characteristics. With the
exception of Luxembourg, the cross-country patterns of micro vs. macro pay gaps are similar.
According to the literature, conditional on characteristics, public and private sector workers can
be paid differently for two broad reasons: (i) the government is the only provider of certain goods
and services, which may generate non-competitive wage settlements. Also, the private and the
public sectors may have different objective functions: whereas the former is a profit-maximiser,
the latter may pursue other objectives such as vote maximization, redistribution, and so on,
which also generate non-competitive wage policies. (ii) Wage setting institutions may differ
between the private and the public sector (union density, collective bargaining, centralization,
etc.).
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public employment over total employment, which accounts for the size of the government sector
as an employer. This variable is expected to correlate negatively with the public wage gap: a
smaller public labour force is more likely to form an insider group of workers that enjoy market
power in the supply of labour to the public sector, and hence can settle more favourable wage
policies. Second, the ratio of Public Administration employees over total public employees. This
accounts for the composition of the public labour force, whether it is tilted towards the provision
of pure public goods (those in the Public Administration, where the public sector faces limited
competition from the private sector), or to individual goods (like health and education, where
competition from the private sector is higher). Hence, it is expected to correlate positively with
the public wage premium. Third, government effectiveness (from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators), which proxy for the institutional quality of the public sector, expected to have a
negative correlation with the wage gap. Higher wage gaps, being possibly the result of distortions
in the economy, are less likely to exist if the quality of institutions is high. And fourth, exposure
to international competition. This is expected to have a negative correlation with the wage gap,
as foreign competition can help increase the efficiency and discipline the process of setting wages
in the economy. We measure exposure to international competition with the share of tradable
sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) in total value added. We also use an index of openness,
the ratio of imports and exports over GDP.
Our test on the second set of theories relies also on four variables. First, one measure of how
much legislation protect workers (OECD), namely, the degree of employment protection in the
economy, which is expected to correlate positively with the wage gap. In view of the theories
highlighting wage setting institutions, we expect that countries with a higher protection of
employment will exhibit higher public pay gaps, since the better the conditions to work in the
private sector, the higher the required wages in the public sector in order to attract workers.
Second, countries with a higher trade union density (both in the public and in the private
sectors) will exhibit generally lower wage gaps, since trade unions are more likely to reduce the
dispersion of wages by collective bargaining. Regarding the relationship between union density
and the wage gap, probably the crucial determinant is the difference in union density between
the public and the private sector. We test if this variable has predictive power in explaining
the wage gap, but our analysis is limited by a too small number of observations with available
data. Third, we include an indicator of whether wages in the government sector are settled
by collective bargaining as opposed to unilateral decisions. Collective bargaining is more likely
to reduce the wage gap, if the bargaining process involves independent bodies that take into
account the labour conditions in the economy. Finally, we include an indicator of centralization
in the update of government wages. If wage updates in the government sector are centralised,
We proxy for the monopolistic power of governments with four variables. First, the ratio of
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3 The determinants of the public-private wage gap
3.1 Cross-sectional determinants of the micro estimates
Given that our OLS cross-section regressions are performed on a small number of observations
(25 countries for which we have estimates of the wage gap) we first explore the relationship
of the wage gap with the variables linked to the monopolistic power of the government sector
and, separately, to those proxying wage setting institutions. In a third specification, we add
together those variables that were significant in the first stage, and also add other proxies for
economic conditions, namely per capita GDP, deficit, debt, and GDP growth, in order to check
the robustness of the results.
Table II shows the results of the regression of the wage gap on the degree of the government
monopolistic power.20 Column (1) shows that countries with a lower percentage of public em-
ployees, a composition of the public workforce tilted towards goods that are provided exclusively
by the public sector, and that are less opened to international competition, have significantly
higher wage gaps. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation decrease in the percentage of public
employees (5.1 percentage points, being the mean 29.0%) is associated with an increase in the
public pay gap of 5.2 percentage points (or .41 standard deviations, being the mean 8.5%); a
one standard deviation increase in the share of public workers in the Public Administration with
respect to overall public workers (8.3 percentage points, being the mean 32.9%) is associated
with an increase of the public pay gap of 5.8 percentage points; and a one standard devia-
tion increase in the share of tradable sectors in total value added (5.4 percentage points, being
the mean 17.7%) is associated with a decrease in the wage gap of 5.0 percentage points. The
only variable whose coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero is the quality of the
the wage gap is expected to be higher, as public wages are more likely to deviate from the
conditions of local labour markets.19
19Our choice of variables referring to each class of models stems from the empirical implications they entail.
We stress size, composition, quality, and efficiency of the public sector as more related to the monopolistic power
of governments, and labour market institutions as more related to public wage settlements. It must be stressed
though that this taxonomy is sometimes not straightforward, and some variables could be justified in the context
of both type of models. We follow this approach to ease exposition and because it provides a good guidance to
specify the regressions.
20Note that the dependent variable is estimated from micro data, and hence it is subject to uncertainty. We
make the assumption that the noise induced by the estimation is uncorrelated with the country characteristics,
and hence this noise only yields higher standard errors, which go against finding a significant relationship between
the covariates and the dependent variable. This seems reasonable, as Eurostat provides a common framework
for the EU-SILC database. Note also that some of the country characteristics are also obtained from EU-SILC
(e.g. the percentage of public employees). For the same reason, it is reasonable to assume that the possible
measurement error is uncorrelated with the observed covariates, yielding again only higher variances. Moreover,
we try alternative specifications with additional data sources when this is possible, to check the robustness of
the results. In any case, we are aware of the difficulties of giving a causal interpretation to the coefficients, as
orthogonality between the covariates and the error term is clearly not guaranteed. Our focus is on checking
the cross-country implications of the the theories explaining the wage gap, and we favour a prudent predictive
interpretation of our results.
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21That is, we show the scatter plot of the unexplained part of the dependent variable and the unexplained
part of each covariate of column (2), where the unexplained part is given by the residuals of the regression on the
other covariates. For example, the partial correlation of the wage gap and the share of public employees (panel
A) is constructed as follows. First, regress the wage gap on the share of public employees in industry O and the
share of tradable sectors in total value added (the other two covariates of column (2)), and obtain the residuals.
Second, regress the share of public employees on the share of public employees in industry O and the share of
tradable sectors in total value added, and obtain the residuals. Third, plot both series of residuals. Note that
the slope of the scatter plot is precisely the coefficient reported in column (2) of Table II, and hence the picture
allows to determine the existence of outliers driving the estimates. Note also that Panels D to F of Figure II show
partial correlations of bivariate relationships, hence they are just simple scatter plots in deviations with respect
the regression, the other three remain statistically significant, see column (2). The R-squared
from this regression shows that these three variables explain 60 percent of the variation of the
wage gaps in our sample. This provides support to the theories linking the wage gap with the
monopolistic provision of goods and services carried out by the government sector.
Table II
Determinants of the Public Sector Pay Gap
Government Monopolistic Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: NACE Proxy to Government Sector Wage Gap (2004-2012)
% Public Employees -0.0103∗∗ -0.0110∗∗ -0.0073∗ -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0076∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0039)
% Public Administration 0.0070∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗
Employees (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Government Effectiveness -0.0197
(0.0383)
% Value Added Tradable -0.0091∗∗ -0.0087∗∗ -0.0059 -0.0093∗∗
Sectors (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0033)
% Public Employees -0.0195∗∗
(over Population) (0.0077)
% Compensation of Employees 0.0044∗∗
in Collective Goods (0.0020)
Openness -0.0002
(0.0005)
Constant 0.3393 0.3130 0.0253 0.0045 0.4718∗∗∗ 0.0552
(0.2308) (0.2006) (0.1615) (0.1568) (0.1589) (0.1843)
Observations 24 24 25 24 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.54 0.49
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on country characteristics linked to the government
monopolistic power in the provision of public services. The regression in column (6) excludes Luxembourg, as its openness
is an outlier with respect to the sample (larger than the mean plus 5 standard deviations). Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
government sector, although it bears the expected sign. When this variable is removed from
are genuine, and are not driven by extreme observations.
Given the small number of observations of these regressions, it is important to check that no
outliers drive these results. In Figure II (panels A to C) we plot the correlation between each
covariate of the specification in column (2) with the dependent variable once the effect of the
other covariates is removed, i.e. the partial correlations.21 We can see that these correlations
to the mean.
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The following columns of Table II check the robustness of these findings. Column (3) removes
the share of tradable sectors in total value added. The size and composition of the public labour
force remain significant explanatory variables of the public pay gap, being able to explain almost
half of its variance. Columns (4) to (6) substitute each covariate by an alternative measure,
capturing the same economic concept. Column (4) computes the size of public labour force
as the percentage of public employees over population, yielding an even lower point estimate.
Column (5) substitutes the share of public employees in the Public Administration by the
percentage of total compensation of employees aimed at collective goods, whose provision is
carried out exclusively by the government sector, as opposed to individual goods, such as health
and education (the source of these data is COFOG). This variable is positively correlated with
the public pay gap, reinforcing the message that a higher monopolistic power of the government
sector is associated with a higher wage gap. Finally, column (6) substitutes the share of tradable
sectors in total value added by log openness. In this case, this variable enters non-significantly
in the regression, although with the expected sign. Overall, this robustness checks are highly
supportive of the main findings: the positive association between the public sector pay gap and
the monopolistic power that the public sector enjoys in the production of certain goods and
services.
In Table III we test the theories that link the wage gap with the wage setting institutions
that prevail in the public vs. the private sector. In the joint regression of the wage gap against
employment protection, trade union density, collective bargaining and centralization of wage
updates, none of the covariates is statistically significant, although employment protection,
trade union density, and centralization bear the expected signs, see column (1). In the following
columns we consider the bivariate relationships of each of these variables with the public pay gap.
In this case, countries with a higher protection of employment are associated with a significantly
higher public pay gap, as well as countries with a higher trade union density. Quantitatively,
a one standard deviation increase in employment protection legislation is associated with a 3.9
percentage points increase in the public wage gap (.34 standard deviations), and a one standard
deviation increase in trade union density is associated with a 6.8 percentage points increase in
the wage gap. The correlation of both variables with the wage gap (in deviations with respect
to the mean) is displayed in Figure II (panels D and E). As can be seen in Panel E, the negative
relationship between the public pay gap and trade union density is driven by the Nordic countries.
Actually, removing them from the regression yields a non-significant relationship between both
variables. Moreover, the variable trade union density corresponds to the whole economy. If we
consider instead the difference in trade union density between the public and the private sector,
we do not find a significant relationship with the public pay gap, see column (4). Nevertheless,
this result must be taken with caution as the number of observations of this regression is very
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Figure II
The Public Pay Gap and potential determinants
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coef = -.01095482, (robust) se = .0041329, t = -2.65
Panel B: Share of Public Employees in Public
Administration
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coef = .00745082, (robust) se = .00222919, t = 3.34
Panel C: Share of Tradable Sectors in Total Value Added
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coef = -.00867302, (robust) se = .0030915, t = -2.81
Panel D: Employment Protection Legislation
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coef = .09137883, (robust) se = .04964392, t = 1.84
Panel E: Trade Union Density
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Panel F: Changes in the CAPB and the gap during the
crisis
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Notes: This figure shows the partial correlations between the public sector pay gap and country characteristics. Panels A
to C show partial correlations with characteristics linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public
services, see column (2) of Table II. Specifically, Panels A, B, and C, show the partial correlation of the size of the public
sector (share of public sector employees), the composition of the public sector (specialization in public goods) and exposure
to international trade (specialization in tradable goods), respectively. Panels D and E show the correlation (in deviations
with respect to the mean) between labour market institutions and the public sector pay gap. Panel D shows the correlation
of an index of employment protection legislation (column (2) of Table III) and panel E of an index of trade union density
(column (3)). Finally, panel F shows the correlation (in deviations with respect to the mean) between improvements in the
CAPB during the crisis and changes in the public sector pay gap, see column (1) of Table IV. Improvements in the CAPB
are computed as the CAPB in 2012 minus the minimum in the period 2007-2011. Changes in the public sector pay gap
correspond to the same period.
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low. We also consider the relationship between the wage gap and the coverage of collective
bargaining agreements, which may capture better the pay homogenization induced by trade
unions. This relationship is negative, as expected by theory, but not statistically significant
(the p-value is .17, not shown). In column (5) we show that there is not a significant bivariate
relationship between the wage gap and wages being set by collective bargaining. On the contrary,
countries where wage updates are carried out in a centralised manner have on average a wage gap
10.8 percentage points higher than countries where wage updates are decided in a decentralised
manner, see column (6). Overall, these results provide also some evidence on the link between
wage setting institutions across countries and the public pay gap prevailing in these countries.
However, they explain less of the cross-country variation of the wage gap than theories stressing
the monopolistic environment in which governments operate, and the results are less robust.
Table III
Determinants of the Public Sector Pay Gap
Different Wage Setting Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: NACE Proxy to Government Sector Wage Gap (2004-2012)
Employment Protection 0.0415 0.0914∗
Legislation (0.0420) (0.0496)
Trade Union Density -0.0017 -0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0007)
Bargaining -0.0172 -0.0414
(0.0506) (0.0484)
Centralization 0.0620 0.1086∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0477)
Public - Private 0.0008
Trade Union Density (0.0031)
Constant 0.0136 -0.1688 0.1703∗∗∗ 0.0435 0.1252∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗
(0.1098) (0.1426) (0.0326) (0.0973) (0.0239) (0.0242)
Observations 20 23 22 11 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.07 0.32 -0.10 -0.01 0.18
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on cross-country differences in labour
market institutions. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
These findings are further confirmed when we implement a horse race between both theories
(not shown).22 Specifically, we add together the proxies for the monopolistic power of govern-
ments and the wage setting institutions (the latter added one at a time). When we regress the
public wage gap against the percentage of public employees, the share of public employees in
22The results are not shown for the sake of brevity, but are presented in Table B.1 of Appendix B. We further
check the robustness of these results by incorporating additional explanatory variables with potential in explaining
the cross-country variation in wage gaps. In particular, we add different proxies of economic conditions, such as
per capita GDP, the general government deficit, the level of debt, and real GDP growth. It turns out that only
the general government deficit has some significant explanatory power in accounting for the variation in the public
pay gaps, and in all specifications the size and composition of the public workforce, as well as exposure to foreign
competition keep their statistical significance.
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Public Administration, the share of tradable sectors in total value added, and the employment
protection legislation, it turns out that only those variables reflecting the monopolistic power of
the public sector are significant in explaining the wage gap, having similar coefficients as those
found in Table II. This result is confirmed when we include the variable trade union density,
whose coefficient is not statistically significant. Moreover, if we add the indicator of centralised
wage updates, it also enters non-significantly. We also checked that these results are robust
to excluding the years of the financial crisis, which may introduce some noise in the relation-
ship between the wage gap and its fundamentals. Actually, the estimates are more precisely
estimated when using the sample 2004-2007, and none of the economic conditions have explana-
tory power.23 In addition, we also check the robustness of the results to adopting a narrower
definition of the public sector. We restrict it to Public Administration (industry O), i.e. we
consider Education and Health (industries P and Q) to belong to the private sector. We find
that the public sector wage gap under such a definition is also significantly related to the size
and composition of public sector employees, as well as exposure to international trade. Labour
market institutions do not have predictive power in explaining the wage gap, once the other
variables are controlled for.24 We also analysed the relationship between the overall pay gap
and that of female workers and workers at the lower-end of the income distribution. If the public
sector follows more egalitarian practices in the setting of wages, (at least part of) the overall
pay gap may be the result of discrimination (for example to women) in the private sector. We
found that indeed in almost all countries the conditional pay gap is larger for female workers
and workers at the first quartile of the income distribution, see Appendix B.4.25 However, the
cross-country differences in the pay gap of women and low income workers are virtually the
same as those of the overall population (the correlations are .99 and .98, respectively). Hence,
the structural determinants uncovered in this section also account for a large fraction of the
cross-country variability in pay gaps of these groups. Overall, then, we find support that the
government monopolistic power explains a large part of the cross-country variation in the public
pay gap, at least in our sample of 25 (mostly) EU countries.26
23See Table B.2 of the Appendix.
24Results are shown in Table B.3 of the Appendix.
25The gap for female workers is computed by estimating equation (1) for the sample of females. The gap at
the first quartile of the income distribution is computed via a quantile regression with the same covariates as
equation (1).
26We also tried running these specifications exploiting the panel structure of EU-SILC (2004-2012) with country
fixed effects and with/without a lag of the public pay gap. These regressions did not deliver meaningful estimates,
probably due to the fact that changes in the structural characteristics of the public labour force take some time
to be reflected on the public pay gap. For this reason, we view the long-run regressions performed in Section 4
as more likely to capture the dynamic relationship between the structural characteristics of a country and the
pay gap. Moreover, we find evidence that the recent evolution of the pay gap is explained by the process of fiscal
consolidation, rather by structural factors, see the next section.
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3.2 Exploiting changes during the financial crisis
During the last few years, the majority of EU countries have undergone intense fiscal consolida-
tion processes aimed at controlling increasing fiscal deficits stemming from the financial crisis.
We showed in Table I that wage gaps indeed got reduced during the crisis/consolidation period,
showing a marked dynamic behaviour. Thus, in this section we study whether the change ob-
served in the gap during this period is linked to changes in its structural determinants or only
reflects the effect of fiscal consolidation measures. Before we proceed, we raise a flag in inter-
preting the results of this section, given our small sample size, the turbulent times associated
with the financial crisis, and the different set of austerity measures undertaken in each country,
which may introduce additional noise in the estimations.
We define the fiscal effort as the difference in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB)
between 2012 and the minimum of the period 2007-2011. This definition takes into account that
some countries carried out front-loaded fiscal consolidations, while others delayed this process.
Of the 23 EU countries in our sample, during the period 2007-2012 18 countries posted the
lowest CAPB in 2008-2010, 1 in 2007, 3 in 2011, and only 1 exhibited the worst CAPB in 2012,
which was nevertheless contained (Denmark, with a CAPB of 1.7 percent of GDP). Armed with
this definition, we study whether countries that made larger fiscal efforts brought the public pay
gap down more.
Column (1) of Table IV shows that indeed improvements in the CAPB have been associated
with significant decreases in the public sector pay gap in the 23 EU countries of our sample.
The point estimate suggests that a country improving its CAPB in 3.3 percentage points of
GDP (the average of our sample) was able to reduce the public pay gap 2.5 percentage points.
Note that the average reduction of the pay gap is 1.5 percentage points, hence this decrease
is very large. Panel F of Figure II shows the correlation (in deviations with respect to the
mean) of the change in the CAPB and the change in the wage gap. Note that the slope is
affected by the huge improvement in the CAPB of Greece, of more than 10 percentage points
above the average. If Greece is removed from the regression, the point estimate is even lower
(-0.0092), although its statistical significance decreases (to a p-value of .08). Columns (2) to (6)
of Table IV explores whether the variables that explain the heterogeneity in the levels of the
wage gap can also account for the evolution during the crisis. It turns out that no variable enters
significantly, suggesting that their effects are mainly felt in the long-run. The only exception
is the employment protection legislation, which enters significantly but with an opposite sign
(more labour protection being associated with a lower wage gap). This result, which is at odds
with theory, is driven by two countries, Estonia and Slovakia, which elicited legislation to reduce
the protection of workers, but at the same time experienced increases in the public pay gap.
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Table IV
The Public Pay Gap During the Crisis
Determinants of Change Between 2007 and 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: Change in NACE Proxy to Government Sector Wage Gap (2012-year of worst CAPB)
Δ12−minCAPBc -0.0076
∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0016)
Δ12−min% Public Employeesc -0.0061
(0.0073)
Δ12−min% Public Administration 0.0010
Employeesc (0.0031)
Δ12−min% Value Added Tradable 0.0090
Sectorsc (0.0107)
Δ12−minEmployment Protection -0.1185
∗∗
Legislationc (0.0551)
Δ12−minTrade Union Densityc 0.0053
(0.0075)
Constant 0.0097 0.0126 0.0105 0.0050 0.0010 0.0034
(0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0123) (0.0149)
Observations 23 23 23 22 20 19
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.25 0.18
Notes: This table shows the regression of the change in the public sector pay gap on the improvement in the Cyclically
Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) during the crisis. This improvement is computed as the CAPB in 2012 minus the
minimum in the period 2007-2011. The change in the public pay gap corresponds to the same time period. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
4 Long-run determinants of the public pay gap
To identify the long-run determinants of the dynamics of the public pay gap, we run the following
regression:
ΔWage Gapct = β
′ΔX ′ct +
∑
t
λt + ct (2)
where ΔWage Gapct is the change in the macro wage gap between t and t − 1; ΔXct are
changes in possible determinants of the dynamics of the wage gap namely, percentage of public
employees, openness, share of public employees in Public Administration, government effective-
ness, employment protection, and trade union density; and
∑
t λt are period fixed-effects. The
estimation is carried out by pooled OLS. Following the literature on growth, in order to remove
the effects of the business cycle, each period is a five-year average.
Table V shows the results. In column (1) we start by studying the relationship between the
dynamics of the wage gap and those of the size of the public labour force and exposure to trade.
The availability of data for these two variables allows us to estimate the regression covering the
whole period 1975 to 2014 (8 five-year periods). We find that increases in the size of the labour
force and in exposure to foreign competition are significantly associated with reductions in the
public sector pay gap. The point estimates suggest that an increase of one standard deviation
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in the change of the percentage of public employees (1.5 percentage points) is associated with
a decrease of 2.7 percentage points (0.29 standard deviations) in the change of the wage gap.
Also, an increase of one standard deviation in the change of the openness ratio (9.4 percentage
points) is associated with a decrease of 1.6 percentage points (0.17 standard deviations) in the
change of the wage gap. This last association is very robust to different specifications, whereas
the relationship between the percentage of public employees and the wage gap, although always
negative, is somewhat less stable (see the following columns). In column (2) we include as an
additional determinant the first difference of the share of public workers that work in Public
Administration. The lower availability of data for this variable reduces our estimation to a
shorter time period, and therefore decreases considerably the number of observations. The
point estimate suggests that increases in this ratio are associated with increases in the wage gap
but, opposite to the cross-sectional regressions, the relationship is not statistically significant
(p-value is 0.31). In column (3) we include the first difference of an index of government quality
(the International Country Risk Guide Indicator of Quality of Government), which captures
the level of efficiency of the public sector. This index has the advantage that is available for all
countries in our sample and for a long time period (1984-2012). We see that improvements in the
quality of government are associated with lower wage gaps (in first differences). A one standard
deviation increase in the change of government quality is associated with a 2.7 percentage points
decrease in the change of the pay gap, which is 0.34 standard deviations, being this relationship
statistically significant. Moreover, this relationship holds when we use an alternative measure
of the quality of the public sector, the index of government effectiveness of the Worldwide
Governance Indicators, see column (4). In this case, a one standard deviation increase in the
change of government quality is associated with a significant 2.6 percentage points decrease in the
change of the pay gap, which is 0.33 standard deviations.27 Figure III shows that this association
is not driven by outliers, although the estimation comprises just 3 time periods. Moreover,
the association between improvements in government quality (including either indicator) and
decreases in the pay gap is robust to including country fixed effects in the change of the wage
gap (not shown). With respect to variables linked to wage setting institutions: employment
protection and trade union density, we find no statistical relationship with respect to the wage
gap, see columns (5) and (6). Although the sign of employment protection is positive, it lacks
statistical significance, whereas changes of trade union density are estimated to be uncorrelated
with changes in the wage gap. Overall, this long run analysis corroborates the importance of
accounting for the government monopolistic power in explaining the wage gap. From a long
time period perspective, increases in foreign competition and improvements in the institutional
quality of governments are associated with significant reductions in the public sector pay gap.
The evidence also suggests that increases in the number of employees are also associated with
reductions in the public sector pay gap, but in this case the estimates are more noisy.
27Kaufmann et al. (2010) note that the Worldwide Governance Indicators use reasonably comparable method-
ologies over time, then the indicators can be meaningfully compared both across countries and over time.
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Table V
Long-Run Determinants of the Public Pay Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: ΔGeneral Government Sector “Macro” Wage Gapct
Δ% Public Employeesct -0.0178
∗∗∗ -0.0087 -0.0180∗∗ -0.0340∗∗ -0.0131 -0.0336∗
(0.0068) (0.0183) (0.0089) (0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0176)
ΔOpennessct -0.0016
∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0016∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0019∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0007)
Δ% Public Administration 1.4048
Employeesct (1.3675)
ΔQuality of Governmentct -0.2457
∗
(0.1320)
ΔGovernment Effectivenessct -0.1631∗∗
(0.0630)
ΔEmployment Protection 0.0699
Legislationct (0.1028)
ΔTrade Union Densityct -0.0023
(0.0059)
Five-Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Period 1975- 1980- 1985- 2000- 1990- 2000-
-2014 -2014 -2014 -2014 -2014 -2014
Observations 146 56 110 57 91 57
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.13 0.21 0.36 0.17 0.28
Notes: This table shows the regression of five-year changes in the macro wage gap on five-year changes of country
characteristics linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public services and labour market
institutions (long run determinants of the public pay gap, equation 2). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
In Table VI we test that our strategy to take five-year averages effectively removed the effects
of the business cycle. We add as additional determinants to the change in the wage gap the first
difference of several proxies of economic conditions, namely real GDP, the general government
deficit, the level of public debt, and the unemployment rate. None of these variables enter signif-
icantly in either regression, whereas the coefficients of percentage of public employees, openness,
and government effectiveness remain stable and statistically significant, the only exception being
the coefficient of government quality in column (4), with a p-value of .19. This reassures the
robustness of the association between the dynamics of the government sector and the public pay
gap.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we provide descriptive evidence on the determinants of the levels and dynamics of
the public pay premia in a large set of mostly EU countries. We show three results. First, more
than half of the cross-sectional variation in public pay gaps can be accounted for by the size
and composition of the public labour force, as well as exposure to international competition.
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Figure III
Partial Correlation between Government Effectiveness
and the Public Pay Gap
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Notes: This figure shows the correlation between five-year changes in the
quality of public services of a country and changes in the public sector pay
gap, once other characteristics are controlled for, namely changes in the
number of public employees and changes in openness, see column (4) of
Table V. The negative slope indicates that improvements in the quality of
public services are associated in the long run with lower public sector pay
gaps.
Second, the evolution of the gap during the recent financial crisis is significantly explained by
improvements in fiscal positions. Third, openness to international trade and improvements in
the quality of governments have been associated in the long run with decreases in the public
pay gap.
These findings are rationalised by a extensive body of research that stresses that the non-
competitive environment in which the government sector operates is at the root of the higher
earnings enjoyed in the public sector. Given the important effects this has on the labour market
and the competitiveness of countries, our findings shed some light on the source of these ineffi-
ciencies and help policy makers design public wage bill policies aimed at providing the correct
incentives, improve overall efficiency, and achieve fiscal soundness.
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Table VI
Long-Run Determinants of the Public Pay Gap:
Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: ΔGeneral Government Sector “Macro” Wage Gapct
Δ% Public Employeesct -0.0184
∗∗ -0.0223∗∗ -0.0194∗ -0.0208∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0100)
ΔOpennessct -0.0015
∗ -0.0016∗ -0.0016∗ -0.0016∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
ΔQuality of Governmentct -0.2381
∗ -0.2539∗ -0.3421∗∗ -0.1888
(0.1301) (0.1485) (0.1317) (0.1447)
ΔLog Real GDPct -0.0607
(0.1242)
ΔDeficitct 0.0035
(0.0047)
ΔDebtct -0.0001
(0.0007)
ΔUnemployment Ratect 0.0051
(0.0065)
Five-Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Time Period 1985- 1985 1985- 1985-
-2014 -2014 -2014 -2014
Observations 110 99 94 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21
Notes: This table shows the regression of five-year changes in the macro wage gap
on five-year changes on country characteristics linked to the government monopolistic
power in the provision of public services and business cycle variables. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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Appendices
A Data: Definitions and Sources
Table A.1
Data: Definitions and Sources
VARIABLE SOURCE DEFINITION
% of Public Employees EU-SILC Number of employees in industries O, P, Q (Nace
Rev. 2) over total number of employees
% of Public Administration Em-
ployees
EU-SILC Number of employees in industry O (Nace Rev.
2) over total number of public employees
Government Effectiveness Worldwide Governance
Indicators
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of
the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy for-
mulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies.
% of Value Added in Tradable Sec-
tors
Eurostat Gross value added in agriculture and manufactur-
ing over total gross value added.
% of Public Employees (over Popu-
lation)
EU-SILC & Eurostat Number of employees in industries O, P, Q (Nace
Rev. 2) over population.
% of Compensation of Employees in
Collective Goods
Eurostat (COFOG) Total general government (GG) compensation of
employees minus GG compensation of employees
in health, education and social protection.
Openness World Bank Exports plus imports over GDP.
Employment Protection Legislation OECD Indicator of the procedures and costs involved
in dismissing individuals and groups of workers.
We use version 2 of the indicator (1998-2013) for
the cross-section regressions and version 1 (1985-
2013) for the long-run regressions.
Trade Union Density OECD and Visser (2013) Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade
union members , divided by the total number of
wage and salary earners.
Coverage of Collective Bargaining Visser (2013) Employees covered by collective (wage) bargain-
ing agreements as a proportion of all wage and
salary earners in employment with the right to
bargaining, adjusted for the possibility that some
sectors or occupations are excluded from the right
to bargain.
Bargaining Table 2 of European
Commission (2014)
The predominant regime of wage setting in the
government sector is collective bargaining as op-
posed to unilateral decision.
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Table A.1
Data Definitions and Sources (Continued)
VARIABLE SOURCE DEFINITION
Centralization Table 2 of European
Commission (2014)
There is de jure centralization of wage updates
across the government sector as opposed to de-
centralization.
Log Per Capita GDP Eurostat Gross Domestic Product, chain linked volumes
(2010), euro per capita.
Deficit IMF & ECB General government deficit (excluding the govern-
ment assistance to the financial sector).
Debt IMF General government gross debt.
Real GDP Growth Eurostat Percentage change of Gross Domestic Product,
chain linked volumes (2010).
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Bal-
ance (CAPB)
European Commission &
ECB
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance excluding
government assistance to the financial sector.
% of Public Employees (long-run re-
gressions)
OECD Number of employees in the general government
sector over total number of employees
% of Public Administration Em-
ployees (long-run regressions)
Eurostat Number of employees in Public Administration
over total number employees in Public Adminis-
tration, Education, and Health.
Quality of Government International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) and
Teorell et al. (2015)
The mean value of the ICRG variables “Corrup-
tion”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy Qual-
ity”, where higher values indicate higher quality
of government. Corruption is an assessment of
corruption in the political system. Law and Or-
der assesses the strength and impartiality of the
legal system as well as the popular observance of
the law. Bureaucratic Quality measures the insti-
tutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy.
Unemployment Rate Eurostat Unemployment rate, annual average.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1539
B Additional Robustness Checks of the Cross-Country Deter-
minants of the Public Pay Gap
B.1 Competing Theories and Business Cycle Variables
Table B.1
Determinants of the Public Sector Pay Gap
Government Monopolistic Power and
Wage Setting Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: NACE Proxy to Government Sector Wage Gap (2004-2012)
% Public Employees -0.0092∗∗ -0.0091 -0.0121∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗ -0.0110∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0041)
% Public Administration 0.0071∗∗ 0.0065∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0045∗ 0.0072∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗
Employees (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0021)
% Value Added Tradable -0.0078∗∗ -0.0083∗ -0.0075∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0087∗∗ -0.0082∗∗
Sectors (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Employment Protection 0.0298
Legislation (0.0540)
Trade Union Density -0.0008
(0.0014)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.0265
(0.0419)
Deficit 0.0081∗
(0.0044)
Debt 0.0001
(0.0005)
Real GDP Growth -0.0081
(0.0113)
Constant 0.1738 0.3063 0.0482 0.4225∗∗ 0.3232 0.3244
(0.2051) (0.2130) (0.5080) (0.1850) (0.2225) (0.1928)
Observations 22 21 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.49 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.59
Notes: This table shows the regression of the public sector pay gap on country characteristics linked to the
government monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labour market institutions, and the
business cycle. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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B.2 Sample 2004-2007
Table B.2
Determinants of the Public Sector Pay Gap
Sample 2004-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: NACE Proxy to Government Sector Wage Gap (2004-2007)
% Public Employees -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0031)
% Public Administration 0.0056∗∗ 0.0069∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗
Employees (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020)
% Value Added Tradable -0.0058∗ -0.0070∗∗ -0.0061∗ -0.0076∗∗ -0.0065∗∗ -0.0063∗∗
Sectors (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Employment Protection 0.0268
Legislation (0.0421)
Trade Union Density -0.0011
(0.0012)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.0076
(0.0453)
Deficit 0.0031
(0.0040)
Debt 0.0000
(0.0006)
Real GDP Growth Change -0.0026
(0.0072)
Constant 0.2748 0.2618 0.1751 0.3510∗∗ 0.2478 0.2777∗
(0.2025) (0.1524) (0.4858) (0.1663) (0.1729) (0.1516)
Observations 17 20 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64
Notes: This table shows the correlation between the public sector pay gap and country characteristics linked to the
government monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labour market institutions, and the business
cycle. This is the analogous of Table B.1 but for the sample 2004-2007 (excluding the crisis years). Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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B.3 Public Administration Pay Gap
Table B.3
Determinants of the Public Administration Pay Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: Public Administration (Industry O) Wage Gap (2004-2012)
% Public Administration -0.0184∗ -0.0130 -0.0190∗ -0.0208∗∗ -0.0140 -0.0198∗∗
Employees (over Total Employees) (0.0103) (0.0135) (0.0100) (0.0085) (0.0108) (0.0088)
% Public Administration 0.0086∗∗ 0.0056 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
Employees (over Public Employees) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
% Value Added Tradable -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0047∗ -0.0051∗∗ -0.0044∗∗ -0.0045∗
Sectors (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Employment Protection 0.0018
Legislation (0.0373)
Trade Union Density -0.0010
(0.0009)
Log Per Capita GDP -0.0074
(0.0336)
Deficit 0.0047∗
(0.0023)
Debt -0.0007
(0.0004)
Real GDP Growth 0.0032
(0.0081)
Constant 0.0818 0.1589∗ 0.1761 0.1534∗∗ 0.0918 0.0881
(0.0880) (0.0858) (0.3863) (0.0546) (0.0715) (0.0676)
Observations 22 21 24 23 24 24
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.35
Notes: This table shows the correlation between the Public Administration pay gap and country characteristics
linked to the government monopolistic power in the provision of public services, the labour market institutions, and
the business cycle. This is a table analogous to Table B.1, but the wage gap is that of the Public Administration
(Industry O) vs. the rest of the economy, whereas in Table B.1 it is that of the NACE Proxy to the Government
Sector (Industries O, P, and Q) vs. the rest of the economy. The presence of the private sector is negligible
in Industry O, whereas it can have a large presence in Industries P and Q, depending on the country. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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B.4 Pay Gap of Female Workers andWorkers at the Lower-End of the Income
Distribution
Figure IV
Public-private Pay Differentials of Women and Low-income Workers
and Comparison With Overall Pay Gaps
Panel A: Female Workers:
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Conditional Public Sector Pay Gap (Micro Data, Females)
Panel B: Low Income (Quartile 1) Workers:
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Conditional Public Sector Pay Gap (Micro Data, Quartile 1 of Log Gross Income per Hour)
Notes: Panel A compares the public sector pay gap conditional on observed worker characteristics (EU-SILC, see equation
1) of the full sample and the sample of female workers. Panel B compares the pay gap of the full sample with that of workers
at the first quartile of the income distribution. The gap of female workers is computed by estimating equation (1) for the
sample of female workers. The gap of low-income workers is computed via a quantile regression with the same covariates as
in equation (1). In almost all countries the gaps of women and low-income workers are larger than that of the full sample.
Nevertheless, the cross-country differences remain.
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